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0. INTRODUCTION 
To sort out complex conceptual histories, one needs to use short-cuts - but we should 
never forget the price to pay to obtain applicable concepts. As Whitehead wrote, we 
have to seek simplicity and to distrust it.1  
Three main questions are in order to probe the issue of degrowth. First, we have to 
make clear that, in the current political context, degrowth is nothing less than a 
                                                          
1 Alfred North Whitehead,  The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, 
November 1919, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1920. Reprint: Cambridge University Press, 
1964, p.163. 
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complete heresy. Meadows and Whitehead are precious to specify its weak and strong 
concepts. On the one hand, degrowth is shown to be inevitable on a finite planet; on 
the other, technoscience lured by capitalism is necessarily alienating, as it prevents 
individuation, solidarity, and culture. Second, two forgotten political exemplifications 
are helpful to picture the critical practicalities: Cuba’s “special period,” and the 
Mansholt Commission. Third, the status of technoscience being, arguably, at the very 
core of the (obvious) vices and (alleged) virtues of the growth religion, a brief Huxleyan 
speculation on its axiological neutrality helps us to conclude. 
1. DEFINING DEMOCRACY, GROWTH, AND DEGROWTH 
Experience shows that, unless the concepts of democracy and growth are clarifed, even 
concerned citizens and scholars have difficulties to understand the stakes of degrowth. 
The immediate reaction is indeed, on the one hand, to argue that market democracy is 
the best possible political system and the only rampart against totalitarianism; and that, 
on the other, technoscience will, of course save us from itsef and ourselves… Hence the 
following three brief introductory steps.  
1.1. Democracy 
The very first thing to realize is that the democratic ideal was still-born. (Never mind 
that Greeks themselves considered it as one of the worst political systems.) Let us focus 
on the Athenian Age of Pericles (462–429) —although Sparta and Lycurgus are 
historically and conceptually equally important— in order to contrast direct and 
representative democracies.2 
1.1.1. What does direct democracy basically mean? Citizens themselves rule the 
city: “democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people” 
(Lincoln, 1863). How is this possible? Through a culture (“paideia”) worthy of that 
name, and especially thanks to the reign of law (“eunomia”), guaranteeing that what is 
best for one is best for all. Three main institutions are created with that aim: the 
popular assembly, open to all citizens (“Ekklésia”); the senate, drawn by lot to run the 
daily affairs of the city (“Boulê”); and the supreme court (“Heliaia”). What are the basic 
principles that should be enforced? On the one hand, the equality of political rights 
(“isonomia”); and, on the other, the equal right to address the political assemblies 
                                                          
2 See Michel Weber, Éduquer (à) l'anarchie. Essai sur les conséquences de la praxis philosophique, Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Les Éditions Chromatika, 2008. For complementary musings on the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Laws of 
Hammurabi, or the Declaration of Cyrus, see Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (eds.), The Secret 
History of Democracy, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
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(“isegoria”). All citizens have the same rights, which means, in practice, that there is no 
limitation to the freedom of speech, and so forth.  
So far so good, but who are the citizens? Citizen are males, born of Athenian 
parents, who did two years of military service (“ephebeia”). Slaves, metics,3 and aliens 
are excluded from citizenship and public life (“koinonia”), as well as women and 
children, who belong to the private sphere (“oikia”). In other words, citizens were a 
minority. Exact figures are not easy to guess. During the Age of Pericles, there were 
perhaps 50 000 citizens, 100 000 women and children, 300 000 slaves, and 50 000 
metics in Athens. In practice, only 10 pc of the population did qualify to rule the city. 
Moreover, since it was not easy for every citizen to travel to attend the Ekklesia, it 
could be that there were rarely more than 3000 citizens to contribute to the debates. 
Last but not least, only the most gifted speakers could efficiently argue during these 
stormy meetings.  
In sum, the Greek golden age invented both political freedom and political slavery. 
The conditions of possibility of the former do not amount only to a strong cultural 
context emphasizing education and leisure —all citizen could accept any political 
position simply because they were properly educated and had the time to do so—, they 
required the availability of a huge workpower, whose status got equally formalized, e.g., 
by Aristotle in his Politics (1254b16 sq.).  
1.1.2. With representative democracy, the kratos is severed from the demos. A Nation-
state cannot be ruled like a City, a community, or an extended family. New enlightened 
institutions are required; and they were created by the US-American and the French 
revolutions. To simplify the issue, let us claim that the equality of political rights is still 
foundational, but limited in practice to the plutocracy, while the right to address the 
political assemblies belongs now to the representatives, who are elected in order to 
make the voice of their base heard. It is however impossible to claim that the 
representatives do their jobs unless exceptional circumstances require them to do so; 
whether people vote or not, for whom they vote, and for what option they vote, appear 
more and more like shadows on Plato’s cave. To use a recent example: referendums, 
when they are possible, display the gap that exists between the policies that are actually 
enforced and the will of the people. What happens when the Danes refuse the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the Irish the Nice Treaty, or when the French and the Dutch 
refuse the European Constitution? At best, they are kindly asked to vote again.  
In sum, citizens are not expected to rule, and they are certainly not informed or 
                                                          
3 A metic was a foreign resident of Athens, who did not have citizen rights. Aristotle was the most famous 
of the “métoïkos.” 
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educated to. What remains of the Greek democratic ideal is the Monotheistic 
translation of the natural isonomia: the self-evident truth that “all men are created 
equal” (Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of  Independence, 1776). If they happen to have the 
economic means to do so, they can go wherever they please; and if they have the 
intellectual capacity to express themselves, they can argue for whatever politically 
correct claim they fancy. But all this will remain politically irrelevant.  
The Greek democratic ideal was one of adulthood, duties and responsibility; the 
Modern ideal is one of juvenile rights and voluntary servitude. Is it not plain obvious 
that freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. are useless 
cosmetics if the exercise of power does not belong to citizens? Of course, the life of 
most Westerners is more comfortable than it used to be since slaves have been swiftly 
replaced by thermo-machines and delocalized specialized proles. The democratic ideal 
has thus been betrayed twice, and the only thing that is left of it is a Manichean 
ideology. Either you embrace market democracy or you are evil. More than ever, it is a 
thoughtcrime to try to think outside of the box. And this is precisely what the concept 
of degrowth fosters but rarely achieves.  
 
1.2. The issue of growth is intimately correlated with the one of progress. Here also 
there has been a recent major twist in the narrative. 
 
1.2.1. Personal growth or progress is an ideal as old as humanity. It means that, if 
the basic or vital needs are provided, everyone is working toward his/her own 
individuation. This is an existential quest that involves, when pushed to the hilt, some 
form of asceticism taking place within a stable, or cyclic world. In other words, until 
the Renaissance, progress was understood only as a personal matter, not a social one. 
With Ficino (1482), Pico (1486), Agrippa (1510), More (1516) and their kins —who echo 
Aristophanes and Plato of course—, individuation gets correlated with social progress 
in a pantheistic atmosphere. The moral ideal of human perfectibility became political 
and cosmological.  
 
1.2.2. When Luther (1517) and Calvin (1536) reform Christian monotheism, they 
introduce two important changes that open both the path for a renewed asceticism and 
for a pure, Comtian, materialism: on the one hand, the accumulation of capital is a 
divine sign of sorts, the tangible proof of a spiritual progress; on the other, transforming 
the material world is only an economic and a political goal. The thermo-industrial age 
will champion this narrative. Either you are a Christian and you believe in market-
powered technoscience; or you are a Free-thinker and you know that democracy and 
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science are one. 
1.3. Degrowth 
In a nutshell, degrowth is the negation of growth, and growth is nothing short of the 
current political dogma. It claims that, as long as the economy is growing, society is 
blossoming: economic and social progress are strictly correlated. Hayek’s (1944) 
argument for a market democracy has, however, to be understood from the perspective 
of the alliance sealed, in the late XVIIIth century, between capitalists and 
technoscientists, thanks to the availability of cheap energy. Its key is ambiguously 
anthropocentric: on the one hand, the goal is to make “man” the master of nature; on 
the other, the means used —a hybrid between the Malthusian struggle for scarce 
supplies and the Spencerian survival of the fittest— are seen as natural ones, whereas 
they constitute the retroprojection, within the natural realm, of the ethos of the 
industrial revolution. 
Hence, degrowth either draws the conclusion of the inevitable divorce between 
“the market” and “democracy,” or seeks to destroy that alliance to boost direct 
democracy. Let us specify this with the two main argumental threads available: the 
systemic approach and the existential one. Degrowth, like tea, can indeed be taken 
weak or strong —the problem being that the weakest brew is not the one most scholars 
think. 
1.3.1. Meadows’ legacy 
Meadows’ legacy offers the most well-known argument and, apparently, the strongest, 
not only because it is well-documented, quantifed and systematized by academics from 
the highest ranking universities: it sprang out of the concern of industrialists themselves 
for the sustainability of their profit-making schemes. In other words, it should not come 
as a surprize that the latest twist the oligarchs are putting on the global political 
narrative should obtain such a visibility, however brief and marginal it has been.  
The Club of Rome’s official founding date is April 7th, 1968, the Report was ordered 
to the MIT in July 1970, and the The Limits to Growth was published on March 1st, 1972. 
The argument is simple: overpopulation and the limitation of the available natural 
resources will necessarily occasion the collapse of the current “market democracy.” It is 
the product of its Zeitgeist, which was made of three main threads: Malthusianism, 
Peak-awareness, and environmentalism lato sensu.  
 First, the neo-Malthusian debate on population and environment, that was both 
scholarly with, e.g., Fairfield Osborn’s Our Plundered Planet (1948), William Vogt’s Road to 
Survival (1948) and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968), and also popular with 
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novels such as Make Room! Make Room! (1966), that fostered Soylent Green (1973), a film 
showing very straightforwardly the political consequences of overpopulation, green 
house effect and dying oceans. Could the battle to feed all of humanity really be over? 
Actually, as long as energy is plentiful, it is feasible to manufacture proteins for the 
masses. Three possibilities are available: GMO, bioreactors, and entomophagy. Primo, 
using the GMO technology in order, for instance, to cope with climate change, is the 
black mirror since Paul Berg (1972), Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen (1972). Whereas 
the first transgenic animal goes back to 1973, genetically modified plants were 
christened in 1983 (while conservatory measures were immediately taken with the 
creation of the “Nordic Gene Bank” in 1984, and intensified in 2006 with the 
“Svalbard Global Seed Vault”). Secundo, bioreactors are the late consequence of 
Miller-Urey 1953 experiment; they assemble proteins out of fungus, atmospheric 
elements, or whatever. LED and hydroponic agriculture belong to a parallel field. 
Tertio, entomophagy (see the Guangdong Entomological Institute or the 
PROteINSECT), is always a possibility. 
Second, the idea that all resources will eventually peak is nothing but new. One 
usually worries about petrol, but water, rare earths etc. could become more 
problematic (even) faster. Anyway, although Meadows is here of course following the 
lead of King Hubbert (1956), let us not forget that industrial societies —or, at least, its 
oligarchs— had just coped at the time with peak coal, and that it happened very fast, 
causing, interestingly enough, the collapse of the British Empire. To clarify the time-
scale: the industrial revolution really kicks in, not with James Watt’s sophistication of 
the steam engine (1784 and 1788), but with the generalization of the use of coal in the 
1830s, that makes ironworks striving. Amazingly, the question of the depletion of coal 
was promptly raised (Jevons, The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of  the 
Nation and the Probable Exhaustion of  Our Coal Mines, 1865) and it occurred equally fast: 
1913 in the UK.  
Third, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) made clear, for those who could read of 
course, the biocidal dimension of market democracies. Additionally, there were 
landmarks such as Georgescu-Roegen’s Entropy Law and the Economic Process (1971), H.T. 
Odum, Energy, Power and Society (1971), and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (1971). 
In sum, the argument is quite simple: there cannot be an infinite growth in a finite 
world. Scientific expertise and common sense are, at last, reconciled. Meadows’ own 
conclusion was unequivocal: either we reform the growth dogma, or we are heading 
for a social collapse. This meant two different things: on the one hand, capitalism aka 
“the market” might be in danger, or, at the very least, industrial capitalism clearly is; 
on the other, “democracy,” whatever that actually means in practice, will not survive 
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the perfect storm.  
If it never deflected the incriminated policies, the Meadows report accompanied, 
or perhaps created, new ones. Interestingly enough, the creation of the Club of Rome 
and the publication of its first Report coincided indeed with the end of the Bretton 
Woods system (1971), the oil embargo (1973), and the official return of fascism —
acclaimed by the international community— with the Pinochet coup (1973). This being 
said, the Meadows argument appears flawed as soon as you take a standpoint that is 
neither the one of the old-fashioned industrialists, or of plain common-sense. 
Remember that the growth in question has one pilot and one engine, and that neither 
are impressed by the idea of a limit. The pilot is the market, i.e., the investors. From 
their perspective, there is no end to the amount of money they can treasure in their 
bank accounts. Furthermore, the very practice of compound interest rates gives rise to 
a financial growth that, in turn, requires a growth in the real economy. From the 
perspective of the unwashed, this looks like a Ponzi scheme. Anyhow, this is why 
capitalists are worse than the aristocrats, who knew about the earthly limits of their 
greed, and usually feared its spiritual consequences. The engine is technoscience, and it 
does not acknowledge either a limit to its progress, or even to our world, neither the 
nano- nor the macro-world being finite. On the one hand, the (bio) nano-technological 
world (theoretically named by Feynman in 1959, then by Drexler in 1986, and 
practically implemented in 2000 with the work of Gardner and Collins on controllable 
bacteria by switch) cancels the first time this intuition of common sense. On the other, 
the cosmological world (the infinite universe “discovered” by Tycho Brahe in 1572, and 
by Galileo, roundabout 1605) is in demand for territorialization since the space 
conquest has become a reality (Gagarin, 1961). The calls for the terraforming of planets 
of the solar system, or even exoplanets (e.g., by Carl Sagan), and the colonization of the 
galaxy (by Stephen Hawking) has now been made, precisely in the name of our 
doomed world. The universe bears witness, as Neil Armstrong reminded us in July 
1999, thirty years after his landing, of the infinity of opportunities.  
1.3.2. The Emersonian spirit 
If the depletion argument is weak in the sense that it can be undermined, the 
existential one is radical. It is quite old —say it goes back to Diogenes the Cynic— but 
it was applied to the consequences of the industrial revolution by figures such as Ned 
Ludd (1779), Emerson (1836), and Thoreau (1854). As the latter wrote, “men have 
become the tools of their tools,” “we do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.” 
Basically, it amounts to underline that technique, in general, and technoscience, in 
particular, tend to dehumanize and alienate its users. In the seventies, Illich has offered 
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analyses that have aged very well; Tools for conviviality (1973) are best introduced with the 
spirit of Whitehead hovering over its legacy.  
The question here is, most definitively, philosophical. What are the conditions of 
possibility of authentic life and how are they bypassed in contemporary market 
democracies? Dewey would argue that anyone who is blessed with a meaningful life is 
necessarily living in a democracy. This claim is however not acceptable as such, 
because representative democracy has proven to be a bankrupt concept, while 
participatory democracy was historically built upon slavery. It is however possible to 
localize the conditions of possibility of authentic life in smaller structures: 
communities.4 Three dimensions have to be taken into account in order to think the 
possible socio-political landscapes. They reflect the three characteristics of the creative 
advance of nature, Whitehead’s core idea: creativity, efficacy and vision. Whitehead 
argues (i) that the world of humans, as well as the natural world (there is only a 
difference of degree of complexity between them), is primarily a creative, eventful one; 
(ii) that these events take place in a context that usually bridle them, and that is always 
modified by them; (iii) that the interplay between creativity and contextual efficacy is 
orientated towards a better future because of the divine agency. There can be a 
creative advance only if these three conditions are fulfilled. How does this impact 
sociology? 
 
1.3.2.1. The individual is without doubt the basic social component —but it is 
neither a static nor an immortal one. Human life, from birth to death, is a growth 
process that can be depicted with the concept of individuation: through life, each and 
every one of us seeks, willy nilly, his or her own destiny. Autonomy or independence is 
the key-word here; and it involves creativity and freedom.  
Creativity means the irruption of the unheard, of the unexpected and the 
unforeseeable. When an event happens, it involves the ending of a past causal chain, 
and the beginning of a new one. In common philosophical parlance, creativity refers to 
process and becoming, and also to natality, birth, and death. Arendt’s equation of the 
principle of  beginning with the principle of  freedom is straightforward. This is what Greeks 
                                                          
4 Cf. Ferdinand Tönnies’s concepts in his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887), that has been translated and 
edited by Charles P. Loomis (The Michigan State University Press, 1957). For all this, see Michel Weber, 
“Paradoxes et contradictions de la pensée de la décroissance,” in Paul Ariès (sous la direction de), 
Décroissance ou récession. Pour une décroissance de gauche, Lyon, Éditions Parangon, 2011, pp. 83-88, and The 
Political Vindication of Radical Empiricism. With Application to the Global Systemic Crisis, Anoka, Mn., Process 
Century Press, 2016. 
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called archein.5 Here dwells the present qua present: “reality appears as a ceaseless 
upspringing of something new, which has no sooner arisen to make the present than it 
has already fallen back into the past.6“ Liberty, conceived broadly, amounts more to 
spontaneity than to free-choice. The point is to distinguish with Bergson liberty qua 
option-picking from liberty qua creation. We are free when we are creative. If freedom 
consists only of choosing between pre-existing alternatives, we are actually not free at 
all since we are strictly bound by these options. The liberium arbitrium is ultimately a 
servum arbitrium.  
Even if the process of individuation is not encouraged or valued in a given culture, 
it is an inescapable fact linked with our finitude and social existence. In market 
democracies, however, creative autonomy is replaced by conformism. Instead of 
seeking to individualize themselves, to dare to be free, people nowadays have a purely 
opinative worldview. Plato, as usual, identified the problem, but it was left to La Boétie 
to pin point it (1574), and to Tocqueville to show the consequences of conformism 
(1835).  
 
1.3.2.2. Although it makes sense to understand community from the perspective of 
the interactive aggregation of individuals in the making, the argument can be made 
that community always comes first, that no individual was ever born in a social 
vacuum (although s/he can die of course in a social void). There is no pre-social 
individual but one can imagine a pre-contractual one. Solidarity, or heteronomy, is 
what matters here, i.e., some form of efficacy and determinism. 
 Efficacy basically means the power of the past, the stubborn reproduction of 
existing patterns, of previous events. In common philosophical parlance, it refers to 
being. It necessitates the concepts of continuity and determinism: the efficacy of the 
past fosters the same patterns for ever. In other words, repetition involves blind 
continuity.   
When solidarity breaks, as it obviously the case in market democracy, it paves the 
way to atomism and individualism. The trick here is to make sure that people love their 
individualistic servitude (La Boétie, Spinoza, Rousseau, Huxley, …) and to blur the 
essential complementarity between individuation and community.  
 
1.3.2.3. The double tension between the individual and the community, between 
                                                          
5 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958]. Second Edition. Introduction by Margaret Canovan, 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 177; see p. 189. 
6 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution [1907], Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, New York, Henry 
Holt and Co., 1911, p. 53. 
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independence and interdependence, is at the root of Jamesian pluralism: there are 
genuine individuals endowed with an existential trajectory incommensurable with any 
other and, yet, they all belong to the one same community that benefits from their 
idiosyncrasies, reinforces them and bends them toward the common interest. In a 
nutshell: “The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse 
dies away without the sympathy of the community.”7 A strong community requires—
and fosters—strong individuals.  Culture qua imaginary institution of society, or 
“paideia,” conditions personal growth so that it is likely to contribute to social growth 
—while the imaginary institution of individuals seeks to bring social progress. (Growth 
and progress are used here in their original existential meaning as inspired by their 
biological meaning. Econometrics is totally irrelevant.) There is, in other words, a 
common sense that inspires the best definition of culture: culture embodies the grand 
narrative that allows the merging of the conditions of possibility of individuation and of 
socialization. When a philosophical school demands renunciation of common sense, it 
undermines solidarity; when it doubts sense-perception, it puts a damper on 
individuation; and when it claims scientificity by rejecting all forms of political concern, 
it paves the way to the unquestioned acceptance of a big narrative that is not worthy of 
that name anymore. Taken together, the three requirements seal the divorce between 
philosophy and life and lead the philosopher to compartmentalize his professional 
activities.  
Vision basically designates an eschatological horizon, a melioristic open trend —not 
a teleological one. To offer an anthropomorphic exemplification: creativity refers to 
natural novelty, cultural invention; efficacy to causation, i.e., the repercussion of past 
actions; and vision to horizon and the projection of oneself in a more or less imaginary 
future. In a community where a genuine vision, or culture, prevails, all citizens are 
animated with a sense of social duty that takes the form of a sacerdotal citizenship: the 
personal (spiritual) quest and the enforcement of the common good do coincide. This 
was at the very least plain in Athenian participatory democracy. France’s Third 
Republic motto—liberté, égalité et fraternité—and the Bildungsroman offer, respectively, 
a global and a local instance that seems more likely to be universally adopted. Culture 
is thus more than an Antique form of leisure—although leisure was neither idleness or 
                                                          
7 William James, The Will to Believe, And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, New York, London, Bombay, and 
Calcuta, Longmans, Green & Co, 1897, p. 231. Dewey has also seen this very clearly, e.g., in “Creative 
democracy: The task before us,” in J. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953, Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, volume 14, pp. 224-230. 
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acedia.8 
We have seen that creativity is wild and efficacy, blind. Only some vision can 
orientate the gearing of creativity and efficacy towards the best possible world. 
Traditionally, the political “right” insists on the individual and on the necessity to give 
as much elbow-room to free will as possible, whereas the “left” argues that community 
values should come first. The two dimensions, properly defined, are required. To sum 
up, culture allows individuals to be at unison within the society. It allows everyone to 
engage fully and responsibly with oneself and the world. To use a metaphor that has 
become quite common: culture factually acts in communities just as the so-called 
invisible hand is supposed to act in markets (Adam Smith, 1759 and 1776).   
In market democracies, the complementarity between individuation and 
community is replaced by a synergy between, respectively, conformism and 
atomization. Furthermore, denizens mistake their atomization for individuation and 
their conformism for solidarity. This is the sure sign that culture is gone, that only a 
“small” narrative is at work—the one of anxiety, hate, terror… Instead of communal 
growth, market democracies foster thus a clone war: all denizens seek the same 
consumption goods through interpersonal conflict, usually symbolized (Veblen, 
Bourdieu). Of special interest is that chiasm, or inversion, between the two main poles: 
individuation is replaced by atomism, whereas solidarity is replaced by conformity. In 
other words, while people think they have some individuality, they are simply crippled 
by atomism and loneliness. They also believe they still enjoy some solidarity, but they 
are actually only soaked in conformal patterns of thought and behaviour. 
2. POLITICS 
So far, we can conclude that degrowth is likely to spring from a depletion (sudden and 
catastrophic, or not) of resources. The much needed political reform that should 
anticipate and ease the process seems improbable without such event —even though 
the actual quality of life in “market democracies” is extremely low if one takes into 
account the existential stakes: individuation and solidarity are discouraged. To put it 
differently: neither the basic needs (from clean air and water to creativity9), nor the 
archetypal fears (pain, suffering, solitariness, madness and death) are acknowledged. 
The life of man is now solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and long.10 To compensate, market 
                                                          
8 Josef Pieper, Muße und Kult, München, Kösel-Verlag, 1948: Leisure, the Basis of Culture. Translated by 
Alexander Dru. With an introduction by T. S. Eliot. London: Faber and Faber, 1952. 
9 Cf. Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50, 1943, pp. 370-396.  
10 “During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. […] [there is ] continual fear, 
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democracies are not only oiled by petroleum derivatives, they are also drugged by the 
pharmaceutical industry, and distracted by various forms of tittytainment.11  
Interestingly enough, there are two important exemplifications of these much 
needed political anticipations. On the one hand, Cuba’s “special period,” (1991–2000) 
and, on the other, the Mansholt Commission (1972–1973).  
2.1. Democracy in special times: the Cuban factor 
Most debates on degrowth ignore, or choose to ignore, Cuba’s “periodo especial,” 
although it provides extremely potent clues on the contingencies involved. Why? 
Because, according to the current vulgate in the international community, i.e., the 
NATO sphere, Cuba’s grassroots democracy, or revolutionary democracy, is an 
appalling tyranny that, by definition, cannot teach us anything besides the nuisance of 
ideology. (The implicit equation between ideology and leftist agenda is usually not 
addressed, whereas the equation between liberalism and science is always explicitly 
claimed.) On the contrary, it is easy to show that Cuba’s experience is highly relevant.  
The facts are simple: after the fall of Berlin’s wall (1989), the USSR and the 
Comecon were dissolved (1991), thereby depriving Cuba, almost overnight, of both its 
main imports and exports.  Following the termination of the Comecon’s support, the 
Cuban economy shrank and the quality of life indicators were greatly affected; 
starvation was looming and the independence of the country threatened. Even 
Davidoff products made in Cuba were officially discontinued in 1991. Of the greatest 
concern at the time was the availability of oil and of its derivatives. Fossil fuels are not 
only needed for transportation, the production of electricity, petrochemy (e.g., plastics) 
and heating/cooling devices; they are essential for agriculture, that requires tractors 
and harvesters, powered by oil, and fertilizers and pesticides, synthetized from oil. 
Food shortages and power outages (that could initially last up to sixteen hours) were 
especially problematic. Starvation was avoided, but not persistent hunger, or 
malnutrition in children under five. 
In other words, the disappearance of the USSR perfectly mimicked peak oil, 
paralyzing the entire Cuban economy. Without strong political measures, famine, riots 
and perhaps even a civil war was inevitable —as it has always been in the human 
history. Moreover, the USAmerican economic sanctions (1960–), that have caused 
major difficulties in the life of the Republic since the revolution (1959), were 
                                                                                                                                                         
and danger of violent death; and the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Hobbes, 
Leviathan [1651], Oxford UP, 1996, p. 84) 
11 This is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1995 concept, taking into account Jeremy Rifkin’s concern expressed in 
The End of Work. The decline of the global labor force and the dawn of the Post-market era, New York, Putnam, 1995. 
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aggravated, in March 1996, by the Helms-Burton Act, that imposed further penalties 
on foreign companies doing business in Cuba. The extraterritorality and the 
retroactivity (ex post facto law) of the USAmerican law are sure signs of its imperialism. 
The Helms-Burton Act was actually a landmark: the law was deemed applicable 
everywhere in the world, and to everybody (not only in the USA and to USAmerican 
citizens and corporations). Moreover, it made acts that took place before the law was 
adopted, illegal! It is unclear what was thereafter left of the foundation of law in 
general, and of the international order in particular.  
Anyway, despite all these events, the country survived. How, and at what price? 
Basically thanks to its strong government, and to its capacity to communicate 
meaningfully with its citizens. If the threat is clearly identified, and the strategy to cope 
with it not only rational but reasonable, most responsible adults do choose to actively 
cope with the challenge. Of course, in societies where the threat is hidden, where 
anxiety is engineered, where citizens are systematically infantilized, none of this is 
possible. Let us pinpoint three specifications.  
First, it would have been impossible to deal with the “peak” without a centralized 
policy involving the relocalization of production when possible, urban permaculture, 
and innovative modes of mass transit. On the one hand, bicycles were distributed, 
camel bus-trailers and horse-drawn taxis were created. On the other, organic urban 
agriculture (“organopónicos”) was developed, first thanks to the local expertise, and 
later with the help of Australian permaculturists.  
Second, that centralization was not total: Cubans realized that they “must 
decentralize only up to a point where control is not lost, and centralize only up to a 
point where initiative is not killed.”12 
Third, Cuban culture made the transition feasable. What are its main threads? A 
strong political vision that fosters the common good. The constant pressure of the US 
sanctions and the danger of a remotely controlled coup. (U.S. governments have never 
stopped sanctioning, even embargoing Cuba; invasion was always an option, just like 
the assassination of political figures such as Fidel Castro.) The solidarity of the Cuban 
people; its public-spiritedness. The existence of a social security worthy of that name, 
involving free health care and free education for all. Of course, the social ceiling has 
always been pretty low by Western standards —but its social floor has also remained 
exceptionally high given the circumstances. Hence people accept to fight within, and 
even for, a system that brings them security and meaning. 
                                                          
12 Eugenio Fuster Chepe, “Disenõ de la Agricultura Urbana Cubana,” Agricultura Orgańica 12, no. 2 (2006), 
6, quoted by Sinan Koont, “The Urban Agriculture of Havana,” monthlyreview.org/2009/01/01/the-
urban-agriculture-of-havana/.  
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Despite all the achievements of these policies, the “special period” ended only with 
the new synergies made possible by the Chavez presidency (1999–2013) —one of his 
main capital sins— and especially by the creation of the Alba (2004–). Whatever your 
political inclination, the conclusion is, however, straightforward: on the one hand, 
Western-style democracies cannot survive peak oil. This was immediately foreseen by 
scholars such as Heilbroner: the transition to economic decline needs a highly 
authoritarian regime to avoid a complete civilizational collapse.13 On the other, it is not 
because the standard of living drops that the actual quality of life is aggravated. 
Econometrics does not measure the counterbalance that exists between needs, desires 
and fears.  
2.2. Europe: the Mansholt Commission 
Ignoring the Cuban venture is unforgivable in political philosophy, especially if 
degrowth matters. But there is a second event that has also become, over the years, 
totally invisible, and that equally needs more scholarly interest: the political 
development of the late Sicco Mansholt (1908–1995), who was the fourth President of 
the European Commission (1972–1973). Some research is needed in order to sort his 
biographical imprecisions, contradictions and apparent ambiguities, and to understand 
his post-Commission agenda. For instance, he claimed in 1974 that he was going to 
work hard during the rest of his life to promote degrowth and to battle the economists 
toe to toe, and he basically disappeared of the political scene after his nine months 
tenure.14  
Mansholt’s political life has been triple, with two main watersheds: in the years 
1945–1958, he was minister of Agriculture, Fishery and Food Distribution in the 
Netherlands; in 1958–1972 he was European Commissioner for Agriculture; and in 
1972–1973, he was, during nine months, the fourth President of the European 
Commission. The breaking points were: the second World War, during which he 
joined the Resistance; and, end of December 1971, the reading an advance copy of the 
Meadows report. Between 1945 and 1971, he considered that agriculture cannot avoid 
high productivity and intensive farming. Hence his expansionist agricultural policy 
                                                          
13 Robert Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974. 
14 His biography is made of interviews weaved by Delaunay, who has also worked on the Meadows report: 
Sicco Mansholt, La Crise, Conversations avec Janine Delaunay, Paris, Éditions Stock, 1974 (see, for instance, p. 
125); cf. Donella H. Meadows et al., Halte à la croissance? Enquête sur le Club de Rome & Rapport sur les limites de 
la croissance. Préface de Robert Lattes, Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, Écologie, 1972. Besides, Mansholt 
adopted the use of French at the Commission because it allowed him more freedom of speech during 
negociations: when there was a disagreement, he could always claim, this time in English; “well, this is not 
exactly what I meant…” 
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pushing for the modernization and consolidation of farms.  
After 1972, he argued, on the contrary, that agriculture should go back to its roots, 
so to speak. That poisoning the Earth and its inhabitants does little to improve their 
lives. In January 1972, Goldsmith had published his Blueprint for survival, and in 
February, Mansholt wrote a letter to Franco Maria Malfatti, who was the third 
President of the Commission. He argued that growth is not an option anymore: 
European economies were, as a matter of fact, already slowing down (the exceptional 
growth of the Glorious Thirty was of course due to exceptional circumstances); that 
this outcome is inevitable in light of the data gathered by the Meadows Report; and 
that this impending crisis is welcome since it will oblige us to go beyond the 
contradictions and shortcuts of capitalism. He added with a sense of urgency that “as 
State socialism, etc. do not provide the solution, […]. I shall consider only two aspects 
of the problem: 1. A rigorously planned economy which would ensure that for each 
person the minimum requirements for existence are met. 2. A nonpolluting production 
system and the creation of a recycling economy.”15 Instead of blindly relying upon the 
Gross National Product to assess the state of an economy, Mansholt proposed using the 
Gross National Happiness, an idea that seems to have been picked only by the King of 
Bhutan. The consumption of material goods needs to be drastically curtailed and 
replaced by cultural goods (culture, happiness, well-being…). Programed obsolescence, 
and all other forms of waste, need to be dissuaded. Transforming the existing system 
will not do; a revolution is urgent: it's not even about zero growth, but degrowth, or 
growth below zero as it is too often pictured. In addition, Mansholt was especially 
critical of mixed economy, which is a hybrid of market economy with planned 
economy. Although nothing beats a rigorously planned economy, even a market freed 
of all state interventionism would be better. Mansholt also praises Allende’s reforms, 
considering that his leadership is superior to Tito. Unfortunately, it is unclear how he 
saw the Cuban democracy.  
When the letter to Malfatti was made public in France in the context of local 
elections, he found against him all politicians, from the right to the left of the spectrum. 
President Georges Pompidou, Raymond Barre (who had translated Hayek), and Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing (who refused to become “objecteur de croissance”) were eager to 
denounce the heresy —but so was Georges Marchais, who was at the head of the 
communist party. A society of scarcity and rationing, as well as the sharp decline in the 
standards of living, was totally unacceptable, even for the men behind the Club of 
Rome, such as Alexander King.   
                                                          
15 Letter of Feb., 9th, 1972, p. 5 —archived at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.  
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In June 1972, a bifurcation occurred between, on the one hand, those who 
nevertheless sought to promote degrowth, and, on the other, those who were trying to 
nip the degrowth heresy in the bud. On the one hand, a United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, from June 5–16 in 1972. It fostered 
ideas such as environmental management, the need to assist developing countries 
(while officially condemning colonialism), the necessity to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction, etc. In sum, it paved the way to the Brundtlandt Commission Report 
(1983) and the now (in-)famous Our Common Future (1987), that substituted the rhetorics 
of “sustainable development,” or “socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable 
economic growth,” for common sense and the practicalities of “degrowth.”  On the 
other, the weekly French news magazine Le Nouvel Observateur organized at the same 
time, the 13th of June 1972, a conference about the Meadows Report. Its conclusions 
can be found in its special issue “Earth’s last chance.”16 On that occasion, Mansholt and 
Gorz seriously questioned the future of capitalism in a non-growing economy. 
Mansholt wanted to tax polluting industrial processes and products. Gorz, who used at 
this meeting the word “décroissance” for the first time, is likely to have coined the term 
in the economic context. Their point was not a blind opposition to progress, but an 
opposition to blind progress.  
In conclusion, Mansholt’s epiphany is quite exceptional for three main reasons.  
First, he understood very clearly that the entire political system needed to be 
deeply and rapidly changed. An “ecological Europe” was necessary: “either we work in 
that direction or we prepare to die.”17 Meadows does not reveal anything new, he 
quantifies and systematizes common sense. It brings proofs. This political necessity 
should be clear to everyone, especially to farmers. Mansholt, who comes from a 
farming family, always knew the stakes, but he was obviously for a long time seduced 
by the promises of technoscience. He knew that using arsenic and mercury to treat the 
soil makes no sense whatsoever, but he nevertheless did. He moreover insists that there 
is no strict correlation between the growth of the economy and the growth of 
happiness.  
Second, he was in a position that allowed him to make his argument heard. There 
is no need to claim that he could actually have changed much of the “market 
democracy,” but simply informing citizens about our predicament could have made a 
huge difference. After all, sometimes even dogmas are reformed, abandoned to 
                                                          
16 “La Dernière chance de la Terre,” Le Nouvel Observateur, Numéro Hors série, juin/juillet 1972 
17 “L’Europe écologique est devenue une nécessité. […] Il s’agit de la plus réaliste des prises de position: il 
faut la comprendre ou se préparer à mourir.” (Sicco Mansholt, “Le chemin du bonheur,” entretien réalisé 
par Josette Alia, Le Nouvel Observateur, 12-18 juin 1972, pp. 71-88, p. 71) 
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destroyed. Of course, Europe cannot be severed from its geographical surroundings: it 
is the entire world that needs to follow new rules of development. This is a task for a 
titan. 
Third, it appears that his brief political activities in the degrowth field were without 
serious consequences whatsoever. Mansholt knew that degrowth was extremely difficult 
to sell politically, but was nevertheless convinced that, sooner or later, it will happen.18 
3. THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Everyone disapproved of the anti-economic growth argument of Mansholt. And indeed 
we are at pains to conceive another world, one in which the alliance between market 
democracy and technoscience would be revoked, one in which our comfortable 
alienation would be replaced by an inconvenient freedom. 
In order to obtain a more balanced view of technoscience, one needs eventually to 
question anew its pilot. It is not far-fetched to claim that technoscience has never 
known any other pilot than capitalism. To secure the concept, it is enough to define the 
birth of technoscience with the industrial revolution. In practice, this means that the 
axiological neutrality of technoscience is preserved, as well as the possibility of another 
pilot. By way of illustration, we now contrast two major novels of Huxley. Brave New 
World (published in 1932; hereafter BNW)19 perfectly exemplifies the destructive-
eliminative postmodernity that is at our doors; while Island (published in 1962) 
beautifully suggests the main features of a constructive-inclusive postmodernity that 
could install the best of  all worlds. Four steps are expedient to sketch the two possible 
futures. We use the same pattern to display a contrast that makes clear that the 
difference between the two “utopias” is very thin. An important difference lies in the 
way hypnosis and eugenics (that were heavily impacting Western culture during 
Huxley's lifetime) are respectively put into motion: they both share a huge destroying 
potential as well as a remarkable civilizational one.20 Besides, the respective cores are 
                                                          
18 Sicco Mansholt, “Le chemin du bonheur,” entretien réalisé par Josette Alia, Le Nouvel Observateur, 
12-18 juin 1972, pp. 71-88. 
19 Aldous Leonard Huxley, Brave New World [1932]. With an introduction by David Bradshaw, 
Hammersmith, HarperCollins, 1994. See my “Perennial Truth and Perpetual Perishing. A. Huxley’s 
Worldview in the Light of A. N. Whitehead’s Process Philosophy of Time,” in Bernfried Nugel, Uwe 
Rasch and Gerhard Wagner (eds), Aldous Huxley, Man of Letters: Thinker, Critic and Artist, Proceedings of the 
Third International Aldous Huxley Symposium Riga 2004, Münster, LIT, “Human Potentialities,” Band 
9, 2007, pp. 31-45. 
20 “Eugenics” was labelled by Francis Galton in 1883; it describes any program that attempts to improve 
human genetic stock —either by limiting the procreation of those with so-called 
“undesirable/unfavourable” genetic qualities; and/or by encouraging those with “desirable/favourable” 
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transparent: on the one hand, technoscience is piloted by the market, and the World 
State is the late outcome of the rule of multinationals; on the other hand, technoscience 
is piloted by Tantra Buddhism —and so it appears that, properly bridled, 
technoscience has a role to play in communal life. 
3.1. The Dystopia of the World State 
The four relevant steps to sketch the “ultramodern” landscape Brave New World creates 
are its motto, mass-productivism and mass-consumerism, and the “savage” contrast. 
First, the motto of the World State: “Community, Identity, Stability.” Community 
basically means conformism and social utility: “Everyone belongs to everyone else” 
(BNW 38). Identity is the main keyword: thanks to the bio- and emotional-engineering, 
each citizen is confined within a very precise social loop; there is (almost—depending 
on the grade) no elbow-room given to individual action. Stability is the sine qua non of 
civilization; total order is guaranteed by water-tight structures. Even science has to be 
carefully monitored. Stability is the highest social virtue because it leads to lasting 
happiness. 
Uphill we find three major tools that seal the total order of mass-production. 
Human beings are simple instruments for engineers that have been themselves duly 
programmed. Everything being artificial, everything belongs to the economic realm: 
“a love of nature keeps no factory busy” (BNW 19). Eugenics has here two guises: bio-
engineering and contraception. Eupaedia means emotional-engineering (hypnopaedia) 
and (subliminal) conditioning. Soma is the omnipotent drug: besides all sorts of 
surrogates, omnipresent music, tap-tv, feelies (tactile talkies) and other overwhelming 
“presences,” the state drug provides peace ad libidum—from a punctual stress-relief to a 
longer “soma-holiday” from reality. Even first-hand religious experiences are 
destroyed/conditioned (to suppress unwelcome emotions) 
Downhill, we find mass-consumption and its three major products (obedient 
consumption, feverish ignorance and mindless promiscuity). Human beings are totally 
infantilized and thereby made “happy”: they get what they want and want only what 
                                                                                                                                                         
traits to breed. A “weak” (and the quotation marks matter) form of eugenism has been first systematically 
put into practice by the efficient and democratic American government (in 1896, in the State of 
Connecticut; outside of any legal frame, it actually occurred as well in Switzerland in the years 1880-1890). 
The “stronger” form of eugenism, concentration camps, was actually instituted during the Boer War 
(1899–1902) —the Last of the Gentleman’s Wars, as they say— by the very creative Lord Herbert 
Kitchener (1851–1916), the hero who died stoically with his ship when torpedoed during the first World 
War. It was designed to complement ideally his scorched-earth policy. Needless to say that reliable 
statistics are quite scarce here. 
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they can get; they love their servitude.  
At the edges of this sterilised and sterile paradise, one finds (i) islands populated 
with “alpha misfits” and, especially, (ii) savage reservations, where marriage, natural 
birth, family life and religion are still in use. 
3.2. The Utopia of the Kingdom of Pala 
Island is Huxley’s last novel (his last publication being Literature and Science, 1963—where 
he pleads for a rapprochement between literature and science). Let us go through the 
four steps again.  
First, a specular motto can be spelled with the same categories. Community now 
means that everyone and everything belongs to everyone and everything else but not 
in the utilitarian way. “Elementary ecology leads straight to elementary Buddhism” —
and vice-versa. No means but only ends—the ultimate one being the fundamental 
global harmony. Identity refers to true individuals; maximum elbow room is provided 
for each person to find peace; however, no complete adjustment is expected: even in a 
sane society, this would not be sound. Stability names peacefulness harmony, perfectly 
indifferent transience. 
Uphill, we find a scientific culture of  awareness: both Western science and 
Buddhist culture contribute to awareness through birth control to avoid Malthusian 
explosion of misery (viz contraception, artificial insemination and the yoga of love), 
holistic education (on all fronts, verbal and non-verbal, prevention and cure…), 
hypnosis (“psychological facts of applied metaphysics”) and spiritual exercises. The 
State also provides a potent medicine —moshka— as a way of liberation from the 
prison of yourself and of encounter with the Ultimate. 
Downhill, there is a holistic culture of  awareness: the goal is to provide the 
possibility to everyone to become a genuine human being. Happiness here means 
awareness, spiritual growth, liberation, not the satisfaction of bodily desires.  
At the edges of this utopic kingdom, we find the international community, as 
Huxley knew it in 1962: mass consumption (e.g., oil-guzzling transport), mass 
communication, mass advertising, opiates, tv. In sum: militarism, ignorance and 
breeding. Interestingly enough, Pala could be heuristically mapped to Bhutan, a small 
kingdom that uses Mansholt’s Gross National Happiness and where Vajrayana 
Buddhism pilots technoscience. Those who claim that Cuba is totalitarian should 
inquire about Bhutan.  
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of degrowth is extremely peculiar for three main reasons. 
First, it has the status of a heresy and, as such, the question it raises does not even 
deserve to be discussed in mainstream political debates. Who wants to go back to the 
Middle Ages? Who can deny that science will conquer darkness? Or that only free 
markets allow true democratic governance? 
Second, the exemplifications that can be invoked are, by definition, suspect. 
Meadows’ data are now obsolete. Illich was a useless utopian. Whitehead was himself 
extremely shy in politics. Castro has nothing of a visionary, and everything of a tyran. 
It is not by chance that Mansholt is totally forgotten, even in Brussels.  
Third, technoscience springs from presuppositons and methodologies that are 
objective. The synergies that are more and more enforced with financial and industrial 
capitalism do not, and cannot, tarnish its reputation.  
Questioning all this amounts to sending sacred cows to the slaughter. The worst 
being, so to speak, that no highly complex argument is actually needed to deconstruct 
growth. A slightly sophisticated form of common sense amply suffices. Meadows, read 
in light of (e.g.) Illich is irrefutable. The experience of Cuba and Mansholt speak for 
themselves. The possibility of installing a new driver in the technoscientific device, or 
to let scientists and scholars go back to their dispassionate quest without any 
interference whatsoever, throws dramatic light on our current predicament. Now, from 
a Greek perspective, a common-sensical approach to problems is nothing else than the 
marrow of politics. By definition, politics is what all citizens could —and should— 
appropriate. If the answer is that common-sense is irrelevant to assess the political and 
ethical consequences of technoscientific capitalism, that only specialists can speak, we 
live ipso facto in a technocracy of sorts, certainly not in a democracy, representational or 
not. (The current use of philosophers to manage deontological issues adds a 
considerable amount of spice to this evidence, because philosophers are —by 
definition— no experts.) 
The need to put the neoliberal fraud into liquidation is more urgent than ever, and 
perhaps that the only ones who could take up the gauntlet are academics themselves. 
In Whiteheadian terms, we need the return of duty and reverence. Klemperer, a 
German Jew who survived the Nazi regime because of his marriage with an “Aryan,” 
provides a helpful testimony. He has described in detail how the German people had 
been lured into Nazi totalitarianism by the manipulation of words, propositions, 
symbols, patterns of thought, and the like. In a nutshell, his interpretation is the 
following: on the one hand, Klemperer is full of commiseration for the suffering of the 
German people, and does not condemn them, not even for the fate of the Jews after 
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1933; on the other hand, he has a deep grudge against the German intelligentsia, that 
had access to all the relevant data, and were endowed with all the intellectual tools 
required to understand the storm ahead… If often they simply did nothing, neither 
taking part nor resisting, sometimes they welcomed it warmly. They are the actual 
responsible for the cultural collapse orchestrated by Gœbbels.21 
And as long as you do not have the wisdom to understand die to become, you will 
only be a sad guest on this dark earth.22 
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21 Klemperer wrote in his August 16, 1936 Tagebücher’s entry: “If one day the situation was reversed and the 
fate of the vanquished lay in my hands, then I would let all the ordinary folk go and even some of the 
leaders, who might perhaps after all have had honourable intentions and not known what they were 
doing. But I would have all the intellectuals strung up, and the professors three feet higher than the rest; 
they would be left hanging from the lamp posts for as long as was compatible with hygiene.” (Ich will 
Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten: Tagebücher 1933–1941, Berlin, Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999, p. 126) See 
Omer Bartov, Germany's War and the Holocaust. Disputed Histories, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University 
Press, 2003, pp. 192 sq. The original reads: “Wenn es einmal anders käme und das Schicksal der Besiegten 
läge in meiner Hand, so ließe ich alles Volk laufen und sogar etliche von den Führern, die es vielleicht 
doch ehrlich gemeint haben könnten und nicht wußten, was sie taten. Aber die Intellektuellen ließe ich 
alle aufhängen, und die Professoren einen Meter höher als die andern; sie müßten an den Laternen 
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